THEBATTLE CRY thatu she red in the moder nera in Japan was Sonno joi,“Restore the Emperor and expel the Barbarian.”It was a slogan that sought to keep Japan uncontaminated by the outside world and to restore a golden age of the tenth century before there had been a dual rule of Emperor and Shogun. The Emperor's court at Kyoto was reactionary in the extreme. The victory of the Emperor's party meant to his supporters the humiliation and expulsion of foreigners. It meant reinstatement of traditional ways of life in Japan. It meant that“reformers”would have no voice in affairs. The great Outside Lords, the daimyo of Japan's strongest fiefs who spearheaded the overthrow of the Shogunate, thought of the Restoration as a way in which they, instead of the Tokugawa, could rule Japan. They wanted a mere change of personnel. The farmers wanted to keep more of the rice they raised but they hated“reforms.”The samurai wanted to keep their pensions and be allowed to use their swords for greater glory. The merchants, who financed the Restoration forces, wanted to expand mercantilism but they never arraigned the feudal system.
When the anti-Tokugawa forces triumphed and“dual rule”was ended in 1868 by the Restoration of the Emperor, the victors were committed, by Western standards, to a fiercely conservative isolationist policy. From the first the regime followed the opposite course. It had been in power hardly a year when it abolished the daimyo's right of taxation in all fiefs. It called in the land-registers and appropriated to itself the peasants’tax of“40 percent to the daimyo.”This expropriation was not without compensation. The government allotted to each daimyo the equivalent of half his normal income. At the same time also the government freed the daimyo of the support of his samurai retainers and of the expenses of public works. The samurai retainers, like the daimyo, received pensions from the government. Within the next five years all legal inequality among the classes was summarily abolished, insignia and distinctive dress of caste and class were outlawed-even queues had to be cut-the outcast were emancipated, the laws against alienation of land withdrawn, the barriers that had separated fief from fief were removed and Buddhism was disestablished. By 1876 the daimyo and samurai pensions were commuted to lump sum payments which were to become due in five to fifteen years. These payments were either large or small according to the fixed income these individuals had drawn in Tokugawa days and the money made it possible for them to start enterprises in the new nonfeudal economy.“It was the final stage in the sealing of that peculiar union of merchants and financial princes with the feudal or landed princes which was already evident in the Tokugawa period.”*
These remarkable reforms of the infant Meiji regime were not popular. There was far more general enthusiasm for an invasion of Korea from 1871 to 1873 than for any of these measures. The Meiji government not only persisted in its drastic course of reform, it killed the project of the invasion. Its program was so strongly opposed to the wishes of a great majority of those who had fought to establish it that by 1877 Saigo, their greatest leader, had organized a full-scale rebellion against the government. His army represented all the pro-feudal longings of Imperial supporters which had from the first year of the Restoration been betrayed by the Meiji regime. The government called up a non-samurai voluntary army and defeated Saigo's samurai. But the rebellion was an indication of the extent of the dissatisfaction the regime aroused in Japan.
The farmers’dissatisfaction was equally marked. There were at least 190 agrarian revolts between 1868 and 1878, the first Meiji decade. In 1877 the new government made its first tardy moves to lessen the great tax burden upon the peasants, and they had reason to feel that the regime had failed them. The farmers objected in addition to the establishment of schools, to conscription, to land surveys, to having to cut their queues, to legal equality of the outcasts, to the drastic restrictions on official Buddhism, to calendar reforms and to many other measures which changed their settled ways of life.
Who, then, was this“government”which undertook such drastic and unpopular reforms? It was that“peculiar union”in Japan of the lower samurai and the merchant class which special Japanese institutions had fostered even in feudal times. They were the samurai retainers who had learned statecraft as chamberlains and stewards for the daimyos, who had run the feudal monopolies in mines, textiles, pasteboards and the like. They were merchants who had bought samurai status and spread knowledge of productive techniques in that class. This samurai-merchant alliance rapidly put to the fore able and self-confident administrators who drew up the Meiji policies and planned their execution. The real problem, however, is not from what class they came but how it happened that they were so able and so realistic. Japan, just emerging from medievalism in the last half of the nineteenth century and as weak then as Siam is today, produced leaders able to conceive and to carry out one of the most statesmanlike and successful jobs ever attempted in any nation. The strength, and the weakness too, of these leaders was rooted in traditional Japanese character and it is the chief object of this book to discuss what that character was and is. Here we can only recognize how the Meiji statesmen went about their undertaking.
They did not take their task to be an ideological revolution at all. They treated it as a job. Their goal as they conceived it was to make Japan into a country which must be reckoned with. They were not iconoclasts. They did not revile and beggar the feudal class. They tempted them with pensions large enough to lure them into eventual support of the regime. They finally ameliorated the peasants’condition; their ten-year tardiness appears to have been due rather to the pitiful condition of the early Meiji treasury than to a class rejection of peasants’claims upon the regime.
The energetic and resourceful statesmen who ran the Meiji government rejected, however, all ideas of ending hierarchy in Japan. The Restoration had simplified the hierarchal order by placing the Emperor at its apex and eliminating the Shogun. The post-Restoration statesmen, by abolishing the fiefs, eliminated the conflict between loyalty to one's own seigneur and to the State. These changes did not unseat hierarchical habits. They gave them a new locus.“Their Excellencies,”the new leaders of Japan, even strengthened centralized rule in order to impose their own workmanlike programs upon the people. They alternated demands from above with gifts from above and in this way they managed to survive. But they did not imagine that they had to cater to a public opinion which might not want to reform the calendar or to establish public schools or to outlaw discrimination against the outcasts.
One of these gifts from above was the Constitution of Japan, which was given by the Emperor to his people in 1889. It gave the people a place in the State and established the Diet. It was drawn up with great care by Their Excellencies after critical study of the varied constitutions of the Western World. The writers of it however, took“every possible precaution to guard against popular interference and the invasion of public opinion.”The very bureau which drafted it was a part of the Imperial Household Department and was therefore sacrosanct.
Meiji statesmen were quite conscious about their objective. During the eighteeneighties Prince Ito, framer of the Constitution, sent the Marquis Kido to consult Herbert Spencer in England on the problems lying ahead of Japan and after lengthy conversations Spencer wrote to his judgments. On the subject of hierarchy Spencer wrote that Japan had in her traditional arrangements an incomparable basis for national well-being which should be maintained and fostered. Traditional obligations to superior, he said, and beyond all to the Emperor, were Japan's great opportunity. Japan could move forward solidly under its“superiors”and defend itself against the difficulties inevitable in more individualistic nations. The great Meiji statesmen were well satisfied with this confirmation of their own convictions. They meant to retain in the modern world the advantages of observing“proper station.”They did not intend to undermine the habit of hierarchy.
In every field of activity, whether political or religious or economic, the Meiji statesmen allocated the duties of“proper station”between the State and the people. Their whole scheme was so alien to arrangements in the United States or England that we usually fail to recognize its basic points. There was, of course, strong rule from above which did not have to follow the lead of public opinion. This government was administered by a top hierarchy and this could never include elected persons. At this level the people could have no voice. In 1940 the top government hierarchy consisted of those who had“access”to the Emperor, those who constituted his immediate advisors, and those whose high appointments bore the privy seal. These last included Cabinet Ministers, prefectural governors, judges, chiefs of national bureaus and other like responsible officers. No elected official had any such status in the hierarchy and it would have been out of the question for elected members of the Diet, for instance, to have any voice in selecting or approving a Cabinet Minister or head of the Bureau of Finance or of Transportation. The elected Lower House of the Diet was a voice of the people which had the not inconsiderable privilege of interrogating and criticizing the Higher Officials, but it had no real voice in appointments or in decisions or in budgetary matters and it did not initiate legislation. The Lower House was even checked by a non-elected Upper House, half of them nobility and another quarter Imperial appointees. Since its power to approve legislation was about equal to that of the Lower House, a further hierarchical check was provided.
Japan therefore ensured that those who held high government posts remain“Their Excellencies,”but this does not mean that there was not self-government in its“proper place.”In all Asiatic nations, under whatever regime, authority from above always reaches down and meets in some middle ground local self-government rising from below. The differences between different countries all concern matters of how far up democratic accountability reaches, how many or few its responsibilities are and whether local leadership remains responsive to the whole community or is preempted by local magnates to the disadvantage of the people. Tokugawa Japan had, like China, tiny units of five to ten families,called in recent times the tonari gumi,which were the smallest responsible units of the population. The head of this group of neighboring families assumed leadership in their own affairs, was responsible for their good behavior, had to turn in reports of any doubtful acts and surrender any wanted individual to the government. Meiji statesmen at first abolished these,but they were later restored and called the tonari gumi.In the towns and cities the government has sometimes actively fostered them, but they seldom function today in villages.The hamlet(buraku)units are more important.The buraku were not abolished nor were they incorporated as units in the government. They were an area in which the State did not function. These hamlets of fifteen or so houses continue even today to function in an organized fashion through their annually rotating headmen, who“look after hamlet property, supervise hamlet aid given to families in the event of a death or a fire, decide the proper days for co-operative work in a agriculture, house building or road repair, and announce by ringing the fire bell or beating two blocks together in a certain rhythm the local holidays and rest days.”*These headmen are not responsible, as in some Asiatic nations, also for collecting the State taxes in their community and they do not therefore have to carry this onus. Their position is quite unarmbivalent; they function in the area of democratic responsibility.
Modern civil government in Japan officially recognizes local administration of cities, towns and village. Elected“elders”choose a responsible headman who serves as the representative of the community in all dealings with the State, which is represented by the prefectural and national governments. In the villages the headman is an old resident, a member of a land-owning farm family. He serves at a financial loss but the prestige is considerable. He and the elders are responsible for village finances, pubic health, maintenance of the schools and especially for property records and individual dossiers. The village office is a busy place; it has charge of the spending of the State's appropriation for primary school education for all children and of the raising and spending of its own much larger local share of school expenses, management aid rent of village-owned property, land improvement and offorestation, and records of all property transactions, which become legal only when they are properly entered at this office. It must also keep an up-to-date record of residence, marital status, birth of children, adoption, any encounter with the law and other facts on each individual who still maintains official residence in the community, besides a family record which shows similar data about one's family. Any such information is forwarded from any part of Japan to one's official home office and is entered on one's dossier. Whenever one applies for a position or is tried before a judge or in any way is asked for identification one writes one's home community office or visits it and obtains a copy to submit to the interested person. One does not face lightly the possibility of having a bad entry inscribed on one's own or one's family's dossier.
The city, town, and village therefore has considerable responsibility. It is a community responsibility. Even in the nineteen-twenties, when Japan had national political parties, which in any country means an alternation of tenure between“ins”and“outs,”local administration generally remained untouched by this development and was directed by elders acting for the whole community. In three respects, however, local administrations do not have autonomy; all judges are nationally appointed all police and school teachers are employees of the State. Since most civil cases in Japan are sitll settled by arbitration or through go-betweens, the courts of law figure very little in local administration. Police are more important. Police have to be on hand at public meetings but these duties are intermittent and most of their time is devoted to keeping the personal and property records. The State may transfer policemen frequently from one post to another so that they may remain outsiders without local ties. School teachers also are transferred. The State regulates every detail of the school, and, as in France, every school in the country is studying on the same day the same lesson from the same textbook. Every school goes through the same calisthenics to the same radio broadcast at the same hour of the morning. The community does not have local autonomy over schools or police or courts of justice.
The Japanese government at all points thus greatly differs from the American, where elected persons carry the highest executive and legislative responsibility and local control is exercised through local direction of police and policecourts. It does not, however, differ formally from the governmental set-up of such thoroughly Occidental nations as Honlland and Belgium. In Holland, for instance, as in Japan, the Queen's Ministry drafts all proposed laws; the Diet has in practice not initiated legislation. The Dutch Crown legally appoints even mayors of towns and cities and thus its formal right reaches further down into local areas of concern than it did in Japan before 1940; this is true even though in practice the Dutch Crown usually approves a local nomination. The direct responsibility to the Crown of the police and of the courts is also Dutch. Though, in Holland, schools may be set up at will by any sectarian group, the Japanese school system is duplicated in France. Local responsibility for canals, polders and local improvements, also, is a duty of the community as a whole in Holland, not of a mayor and officials politically elected.
The true difference between the Japanese form of government and such cases in Western Europe lies not in form but in functioning. The Japanese rely on old habits of deference set up in their past experience and formalized in their ethical system and in their etiquette. The State can depend upon it that, when their Excellencies function in their“proper place,”their prerogatives will be respected, not because the policy is approved but because it is wrong in Japan to override boundaries between prerogatives. At the topmost level of policy“popular opinion”is out of place. The government asks only“popular support.”When the State stakes out its own official field in the area of local concern, also, its jurisdiction is accepted with deference. The State, in all its domestic functions, is not a necessary evil as it is so generally felt to be in the United States. The State comes nearer, in Japanese eyes, to being the supreme good.
The State, moreover, is meticulous in recognizing“proper place”for the will of the people. In areas of legitimate popular jurisdiction it is not too much to say that the Japanese State has had to woo the people even for their own good. The State agricultural extension agent can act with about as little authoritarianism in improving old methods of agriculture as his counterpart can in Idaho. The State official advocating State-guaranteed farmers’credit associations or farmers’co-operatives for buying and selling must hold longdrawn-out round-tables with the local notables and then abide by their decision. Local affairs require local management, The Japanese way of life allocates proper authority and defines its proper sphere. It gives much greater deference-and therefore freedom of action-to“superiors”than Western cultures do, but they too must keep their station. Japan's motto is: Everything in its place.
In the field of religion the Meiji statesmen made much more bizarre formal arrangements than in government. They were however carrying out the same Japanese motto. The State took as its realm a worship that specifically upholds the symbols of national unity and superiority, and in all the rest it left freedom of worship to the individual. This area of national jurisdiction was State Shinto. Since it was concerned with proper respect to national symbols, as saluting the flag is in the United States, State Shinto was, they said,“no religion.”Japan therefore could require it of all citizens without violating the Occidental dogma of religious freedom any more than the United States violates it in requiring a salute to the Stars and Stripe. It was a mere sign of allegiance. Because it was“not religion,”Japan could teach it in the schools without risk of Occidental criticism. State Shinto in the schools becomes the history of Japan from the age of the gods and the veneration of the Emperor,“ruler from ages eternal.”It was State-supported, Stateregulated. All other areas of religion, even denominational or cult Shinto, to say nothing of Buddhist and Christian sects, were left to individual initiative much as in the United States. The two areas were even administratively and financially separated; State Shinto was in the charge of its own bureau in the Home Office and its priests and ceremonies and shrines were supported by the State. Cult Shinto and Buddhist and Christian sects were the concern of a Bureau of Religion in the Department of Education and were supported by voluntary contributions of members.
Because of Japan's official position on the subject one cannot speak of State Shinto as a vast Established Church, but one can at least call it a vast Establishment. There were over 110000 shrines ranging all the way from the great Ise Shrine, temple of the Sun Goddess, to small local shrines which the officiating priest cleans up for the occasion of a special ceremony. The national hierarchy of priests paralleled the political and the lines of authority ran from the lowest priest through the district and prefectural priests to their priestly Excellencies at the top. They performed ceremonies for the people rather than conducting worship by the people, and there was in State Shinto nothing paralleling our familiar church-going. Priests of State. Shinto-since it was no religion-were forbidden by law to teach any dogma and there could be no church services as Westerners understand them. Instead, on the frequent days of rites official representatives of the community came and stood before the priest while he purified them by waving before them a wand with hemp and paper streamers. He opened the door of the inner shrine and called down the gods, with a high-pitched cry, to come to partake of a ceremonial meal. The priest prayed and each participant in order of rank presented with deep obeisance that omnipresent object in old and new Japan: a twig of their sacred tree with pendant strips of white paper. The priest then sent back the gods with another cry and closed the doors of the inner shrine. On the festival days of State Shinto the Emperor in his turn observed rites for the people and government offices were closed. But these holidays were not great popular fête-days like the ceremonies in honor of local shrines or even Buddhist holidays. Both of these are in the“free”area outside of State Shinto.
In this area the Japanese people carry on the great sects and fete-days which are close to their hearts. Buddhism remains the religion of the great mass of the people and the various sects with their different teachings and founding prophets are vigorous and omnipresent. Even Shinto has its great cults which stand outside of State Shinto. Some were strongholds of pure nationalism even before the government in the nineteen-thirties took up the same position, some are faith-healing sects often compared to Christian Science, some hold by Confucian tenets, some have specialized in trance states and pilgrimages to sacred mountain shrines. Most of the popular fete-days, too, have been left outside of State Shinto. The people on such days throng to the shrines. Each person purifies himself by rinsing out his mouth and he summons the god to descend by pulling a bell rope or clapping his hands. He bows in veneration, sends back the god by another pull of the bell cord or clapping of hands, tand goes off for the main business of the day which is buying knickknacks and tidbits from the vendors who have set up their stalls, watching wrestling matches or exorcism or kagura dances,which are liberally enlivened by clowns,and generally enjoying the great throng. An Englishman who had lived in Japan quoted William Blake's verse which he always remembered on Japanese fête-days:
If at the church they would give us some ale,
And a pleasant fire our souls to regale,
We’d sing and we'd pray all the livelong day,
Nor ever once wish from the church to stray.
Except for those few who have professionally dedicated themselves to religious austerities, religion is not austere in Japan. The Japanese are also addicted to religious pilgrimages and these too are greatly enjoyed holidays.
Meiji statesmen, therefore, carefully marked out the area of State functioning in government and of State Shinto in the field of religion. They left other areas to the people but they ensured to themselves as top officials of the new hierarchy dominance in matters which in their eyes directly concerned the State. In setting up the Armed Forces they had a similar problem. They rejected, as in other fields, the old caste system but in the Army they went farther than in civilian life. They outlawed in the Armed Services even the respect language of Japan, though in actual practice old usage of course persists. The Army also promoted to officer's rank on the basis of merit, not of family, to a degree which could hardly be put into effect in other fields. Its reputation among Japanese in this respect is high and apparently deservedly so. It was certainly the best means available by which to enlist popular support for the new Army. Companies and platoons, too, were formed from neighbors of the same region and peacetime military service was spent at posts close to one's home. This meant not only that local ties were conserved but that every man who went through Army training spent two years during which the relationship between officers and men, between second-year men and first-year men, superseded that between samurai and farmers or between rich and poor. The Army functioned in many ways as a democratic leveler and it was in many ways a true people's army. Whereas the Army in most other nations is depended upon as the strong arm to defend the status quo, in Japan the Army's sympathy with the small peasant has lined it up in repeated protests against the great financiers and industrialists.
Japanese statesmen may not have approved of all the consequences of building up a people's army but it was not at this level where they saw fit to ensure Army supremacy in the hierarchy. That objective they made sure of by arrangements in the very highest spheres. They did not write these arrangements into the Constitution but continued as customary procedure the already recognized independence of the High Command from the civil government. The Ministers of the Army and the Navy, in contrast for instance to the head of the Foreign Office and domestic bureaus, had direct access to the Emperor himself and could therefore use his name in forcing through their measures. They did not need to inform or consult their civilian colleagues of the Cabinet. In addition the Armed Services held a whip hand over any Cabinet. They could prevent the formation of a Cabinet they distrusted by the simple expedient of refusing to release generals and admirals to hold military portfolios in the Cabinet. Without such high officers of the active service to fill the positions of Army and Navy Ministers there could be no cabinet; no civilians or retired officers could hold these posts. Similarly, if the Armed Services were displeased at any act of the Ministry, they could cause its dissolution by recalling their Cabinet representatives. On this highest policy level the top military hierarchy made sure that it need brook no interference If it needed any further guarantees it had one in the Constitution:“If the Diet fails to approve the budget submitted, the budget of the previous year is automatically available to the Government for the current year.”The exploit of the Army in occupying Manchuria when the Foreign Office had promised that the Army would not take this step was only one of the instances when the Army hierarchy successfully supported its commanders in the field in the absence of agreed Cabinet policy. As in other fields, so with the Army: where hierarchical privileges are concerned the Japanese tend to accept all the consequences, not because of agreement about the policy but because they do not countenance overriding boundaries between prerogatives.
In the field of industrial development Japan pursued a course which is unparalleled in any Western nation. Again their Excellencies arranged the game and set the rules. They not only planned, they built and financed on government money the industries they decided they needed. A State bureaucracy organized and ran them. Foreign technicians were imported and Japanese were sent to learn abroad. Then when, as they said, these industries were“well organized and business was prosperous,”the government disposed of them to private firms. They were sold gradually at“ridiculously low prices”to a chosen financial oligarchy, the famous Zaibatsu, chiefly the Mitsui and Mitsubishi families. Her statesmen judged that industrial development was too important to Japan to be entrusted to laws of supply and demand or to free enterprise. But this policy was in no way due to socialistic dogma; it was precisely the Zaibatsu who reaped the advantages. What Japan accomplished was that with the minimum of fumbling and wastage the industries she deemed necessary were established.
Japan was by these means able to revise“the normal order of the starting point and succeeding stages of capitalist production.”Instead of beginning with the production of consumer goods and light industry, she first undertook key heavy industries. Arsenals, shipyards, iron works, construction of railroads had priority and were rapidly brought to a high stage of technical efficiency. Not all of these were released to private hands and vast military industries remained under government bureaucracy and were financed by special government accounts.
In this whole field of the industries to which the government gave priority, the small trader or the non-bureaucratic manager had no“proper place.”Only the state and the great trusted and politically favored financial houses operated in this area. But as in other fields of Japanese life there was a free area in industry too. These were the“leftover”industries which operated with minimum capitalization and maximum utilization of cheap labor. These light industries could exist without modern technology and they do. They function through what we used to call in the United States home sweat-shops. A small-time manufacturer buys the raw material, lets it out to a family or a small shop with four or five workers, takes it back again, repeats by letting it out again for another step in processing and at last sells the product to the merchant or exporter.In the nineteen-thirties no less than 53 percent of all persons industrially employed in Japan we working in this way in shops and homes having less than five workers. Many of these workers are protected by old paternalistic customs of apprenticeship and many are mothers who in Japan's great cities sit in their own homes over their piecework with their babies strapped on their backs.
This duality of Japanese industry is quite as important in Japanese ways of life as duality in the field of government or religion. It is as if, when Japanese statesmen decided that they needed an aristocracy of finance to match their hierarchies in other fields, they built up for them the strategic industries, selected the politically favored merchant houses and affiliated them in their“proper stations”with the other hierarchies. It was no part of their plan for government to cut loose from these great financial houses and the Zaibatsu profited by a kind of continued paternalism which gave them not only profit but high place. It was inevitable, granted old Japanese attitudes toward profit and money, that a financial aristocracy should fall under attack from the people, but the government did what it could to build it up according to accepted ideas of hierarchy. It did not entirely succeed, for the Zaibatsu has been under attack from the so-called Young Officers’groups of the Army and from rural areas. But it still remains true that the greatest bitterness of Japanese public opinion is turned not against the Zaibatsu but against the narikin.Narikin is often translated“nouveau riche”but that does not do justice to the Japanese feeling. In the United States nouveaux riches are strictly“newcomers”; they are laughable because they are gauche and have not had time to acquire the proper polish. This liability, however, is balanced by the heartwarming asset that they have come up from the log cabin, they have risen from driving a mule to controlling oil millions. But in Japan a narikin is a term taken from Japanese chess and means a pawn promoted to queen. It is a pawn rampaging about the board as a“big shot.”It has no hierarchical right to do any such thing. The narikin is believed to have obtained his wealth by defrauding or exploiting others and the bitterness directed toward him is as far as possible from the attitude in the United States toward the“home boy who makes good.”Japan provided a place in her hierarchy for great wealth and kept an alliance with it; when wealth is achieved in the field outside, Japanese public opinion is bitter against it.
The Japanese, therefore, order their world with constant reference to hierarchy. In the family and in personal relations, age, generation, sex, and class dictate proper behavior. In government, religion, the Army, and industry, areas are carefully separated into hierarchies where neither the higher nor the lower may without penalty overstep their prerogatives. As long as“proper station”is maintained the Japanese carry on without protest. They feel safe. They are of course often not“safe”in the sense that their best good is protected but they are“safe”because they have accepted hierarchy as legitimate. It is as characteristic of their judgment on life as trust in equality and free enterprise is of the American way of life.
Japan's nemesis came when she tried to export her formula for“safety.”In her own country hierarchy fitted popular imagination because it had moulded it. Ambitions could only be such as could take shape in that kind of a world. But it was a fatal commodity for export. Other nations resented Japan's grandiloquent claims as an impertinence and worse. Japan's officers and troops, however, in each occupied country continued to be shocked that the inhabitants did not welcome them. Was Japan not offering them a place, however lowly, in a hierarchy and was not hierarchy desirable even for those on the lower steps of it? Their War Services continued to get out series of war films which figured China's“love”for Japan under the image of desperate and disordered Chinese girls who found happiness by falling in love with a Japanese soldier or a Japanese engineer. It was a far cry from the Nazi version of conquest yet it was no more successful in the long run. They could not exact from other nations what they had exacted of themselves. It was their mistake that they thought they could. They did not recognize that the system of Japanese morality which had fitted them to“accept their proper station”was something they could not count on elsewhere. Other nations did not have it. It is a genuine product of Japan. Her writers take this system of ethics so much for granted that they do not describe it and a description of it is necessary before one can understand the Japanese.
宣告近代日本到来的战斗口号是尊王攘夷，即“王政复古”、“驱逐夷狄”。这个标语的含义是努力保持日本不被外部世界所污染，并且重现10世纪的黄金时光，那时还处于天皇和将军“双重统治”格局形成之前。天皇在京都的宫廷最为反动。天皇派的胜利对他的支持者来说，意味着羞辱和驱逐外国人，意味着恢复日本传统生活方式，意味着“改革派”在国内事务上没有发言权。强大的外样大名，作为倒幕的急先锋，认为“尊王”是一条帮助他们代替德川家族来统治日本的途径，因此只希望在人事上稍稍变更；农民们希望能够在收获后保留住更多稻米，但是他们痛恨“改革”；武士希望能保住他们的津贴，并且为了更多的荣耀他们可以上阵杀敌；在资金上资助了尊王势力的商人们，希望扩张商业主义，但他们从来没有对封建制度提出过诘难。
当1868年倒幕势力以尊王为名取得胜利，“双重统治”终结时，以西方标准看，胜利者会出台严苛保守的闭关锁国政策。但新政权一开始就采取了相反的方针。在所有的藩废除大名的课税权时，它掌权才仅一年。它召集国民进行土地登记，因为农民“归大名的40%收成”以后要归国家，它要核实土地。这种征用并不是没有补偿的。政府为每一个大名分配的俸禄相当于他正常收入的一半。同时，政府还为大名免去了武士和公用项目的开销。武士就像大名一样，也从政府那里接受津贴[1]。在以后的5年中，所有法律上的阶级不平等表现被大刀阔斧地废除。家族徽章、代表种姓和阶级的有特色的服饰，都被宣布为非法——甚至下令散发[2]，贱民也被解放。土地不可转让的法律被废除，各藩之间相互隔离的关卡被移除，佛教被取消特殊地位。1876年，大名和武士的津贴变更了方式，改为将5年到15年后的俸禄额打包趸发[3]。这些薪酬与个人在幕府时期的固定收入相比，有的多些，有的少些，但是一次性发放的这笔钱使他们可以在这一崭新的非封建社会中开创一番事业。“商人或金融巨子与封建土地贵族结成了特殊的联盟，这在幕府时期就已经存在，现在是其正式确立阶段。”[4]
早期明治政权这些旗帜鲜明的改革并不太受欢迎。在1871年到1873年间，国民的热情更多地放在对朝鲜的侵略，而不是这些改革措施上。明治政权不仅坚持激进的改革进程，而且将侵略计划否决了。政府的规划与曾经为成立此政权而战斗过的很多人的愿望截然相反，导致这些人的领袖西乡隆盛在1877年组织了一场声势浩大的反抗政府行为。他的军队反映了所有尊王支持者中亲封建势力的渴望——从恢复天皇地位的第一年起，明治政府就背叛了这一渴望。政府召集了一支没有武士参与的志愿军队伍，打败了西乡隆盛的武士队伍。但是这种反叛本身正表明对政权的不满已经被激发到了极点。
农民的不满也同样明显。在明治第一个10年，1868年到1878年间，至少发生过190次农民暴动。在1877年，新的政府才拖拖拉拉地开始减轻加之于农民的沉重赋税。农民有理由认为政府辜负了他们。农民还反对改革后增加了以下项目：学校建设、征兵、土地调查、散发令、给贱民法律上的平等权、官方对佛教地位的强烈限制、改用阳历，以及各种改变他们既定生活方式的措施。
那么，主持了这么激进而且不受欢迎的改革的“政府”是谁？正是由下层武士和商人阶级组成的“特殊联盟”，它甚至是在封建时代由日本特殊条件孕育而成的。这些武士在担任大名的管家和管理人时学会了治理国家的方法。他们曾经经营铁矿、纺织、造纸之类的封建专卖事业。他们是购买了武士身份的商人，并且在武士阶级中散播了生产技术的相关知识。这一武士和商人的联合体很快推出了有能力且自信的人才，他们为明治政权提出政策，并且组织实施政策。然而，真正的问题并不是他们来自于什么阶级，而是他们如何成为这么有能力、这么富有实践精神的人。在19世纪后半叶从中世纪脱身而出的日本，国力之衰犹如今天之暹罗，却能产生一群卓越领袖，他们策划并执行的事业最具政治家风范，也最成功，就像所有国家所期待的那样。这些领袖的所有优势和劣势都根植于日本传统性格。这一性格曾经是什么？现在是什么？这是我这本书要讨论的一个主题。这里我们暂且先来了解明治时期的政治家们是如何进行他们的事业的。
他们根本不将自己的任务视为一项意识形态的革命，而是视之为一项事业。他们怀抱这样的信念时，其目标就是将日本变成一个举足轻重的国家。他们并不是圣像破坏者。他们对封建阶级既不切齿痛骂也不摇尾乞怜。他们用俸禄引诱封建阶级，而且津贴多得足以让这些人最终支持新政权。他们最终改善了农民的处境；他们对此事的延宕更多的是缘于早期明治政权拮据的财政条件，而不是他们拒绝理会农民阶级对政权的呼吁。
然而，主持明治政府的精力充沛、足智多谋的政治家们，拒绝了终结日本等级制的主张。“王政复古”通过将天皇放在巅峰和排除幕府将军，简化了等级秩序。通过撤藩，王政复古后的政治家们消除了忠于藩主和忠于国家之间的冲突。这些变化并没有否定等级制习惯，只是给了它一个新位置。那些被称为“阁下”的日本新领袖，甚至加强并集中了统治权，为的是将他们技巧精湛的计划普及到所有人。他们采取恩威并施的方式，自上而下来达到目的。但是当他们面对一些舆论时，却丝毫没想去迎合，这些观点包括：不赞成用阳历、建立公立学校，以及把反对将贱民与平民差别对待定为非法。
从上面赐予的恩惠之一就是天皇在1889年颁给臣民的《大日本帝国宪法》。它给予人民在国家中的地位，并设立了国会。它是由那些“阁下”对不同西方国家的宪法经过一番批判性考察，再经由细致考虑之后才提出的。它的作者采取了“尽可能的防范措施来预防人民的干涉和舆论的侵扰”。起草宪法的机构属于宫内省，因此它是极神圣的。
明治政治家非常在意他们的目标。在19世纪80年代，宪法的缔造者伊藤博文公爵[5]派遣木户侯爵[6]到英国向赫伯特·斯宾塞[7]请教日本所面临的问题。经过长时间的交谈之后，斯宾塞给出了自己的答案并寄给伊藤。就等级制这一论题，斯宾塞写道：在传统社会结构中，日本针对国家福利拥有无与伦比的基础，这一基础应该被保留并发扬光大。他写道：传统中子弟对长者所承担的义务，以及所有人对于天皇所承担的义务，是日本巨大的机会。在“长者”的指导下，日本可以坚定无疑地前行，而且可以克服那些在个人主义国家不可避免的困难。伟大的明治政治家们非常满意他们自己的信念得到了确认。他们决心在现代世界中仍保留“各得其所”的优点。他们并不希望破坏等级制传统。
不管是在政治、宗教还是经济领域，明治政治家们在国家和国民之间总是根据“各得其所”来分派大家所应承担的义务。它的整个规划无论对美国人还是英国人来说，都是陌生的，我们经常无法理解它的基本要点。当然，还有自上颁布的强硬的规则，这些是无须听从民意的指导的。政府由等级制中的顶尖阶层所掌控，从来不会把民选人物纳入其中。从这一层面来说，国民没有发言权。在1940年，政府的最高层包括那些能够“谒见”天皇的人、天皇身边的顾问、天皇御玺任命的官员。这些官员包括阁僚、府县知事、法官、各部大臣以及其他有责任的官员。而在等级制中，民选官员不会有这样的身份，而且由选举产生的国会议员，对遴选、任命内阁成员，或者金融部门（大藏省）以及交通部门（运输省）的长官就更是说不上话。经过选举产生的国会下院虽然在一些事务上能说得上话，比如他们拥有质询或者批评高级官员的特权；但是，它在任命、决定、预算事务上没有真正的话语权，当然也不能提起立法。下院甚至被没有民选的上院控制，而上院一半都是贵族，另有四分之一是皇室任命的。在对法律的批准权上，上院和下院平分秋色，这就再次印证了深刻的等级制。
因此，日本保证了那些把持高级政府的人一直是那些“阁下”们。但是这并不意味着日本人在他们各得其所的位置上没有自治。在所有亚洲国家中，不管是什么样的政权，从上面来的权威总是向下延伸，并且在中途和从下发展起来的地方自治相对接。在不同的国家，不同点表现在：民主范围最深达到哪一层，有多少人民代表，地方领导们是否对整个社区依旧保持负责任的态度；或者说，地方领导职位是否被地方上的富豪们霸占，而这对当地人来说是不利的。德川幕府时期的日本和中国一样，由5到10个家庭组成一小组，用现代话说就是“邻组”。它是人口最小的责任单位，由相邻而居的家庭所组成。这个小组的头儿，在自己的管辖事务中，要对小组内每个人拥有良好行为负责，他必须向上级汇报任何可疑的行为，向政府举报任何被通缉的人。明治政治家最开始曾取缔了这一制度，但是后来又恢复了它，并称之为“邻组”。在城镇和城市中，政府有时积极培育邻组，但是在乡村中，邻组没有发挥作用。在那里，“部落”这一单位组织更加重要。“部落”既没有被取缔，也没有被纳入政府管辖的单元中。部落中，政府没有发挥其效能。这些由15个左右的房子所组成的部落，直到今天还在发挥着作用。部落长每年更换一次，这些部落长“照看部落资产，在家庭遭遇死亡或者火灾时监督部落给予帮助，在农业问题、修房盖屋、道路修筑上决定什么日子合作干活儿，在发生火灾时负责敲钟，或者在地方节日和休息日时，以固定旋律在街区之间敲击乐器”。[8]这些部落长并不像其他亚洲国家那样，他们没有在社区内收集国税的责任，因此他们不承担这一重任。他们和其他居民没有矛盾，而且是在民主范围内发挥作用。
日本近代公民政府从官方来说，已经确认了市、町和村的地方行政机构。被选出来的“长老”再选择一个能承担责任的首领，由他来作为社区的代表，来处理所有与国家相关的事宜，而国家是由中央政府和府县公署来代表的。在乡村，这个首领是一个年老居民，一个拥有土地的家庭的成员。在财政出现亏空时，他要承担责任，但是他获得的声望也是可观的。他和长老们在乡村财政、公共卫生、维持教育，尤其是财产登记和个人档案方面负有责任。村公所是一个繁忙的地方：它掌管了国家划拨给基础教育的款项，这些款项是提供给所有孩子的；它还掌管了一笔更大的教育经费，这笔款项从当地居民筹集而来，村公所承担了款项筹集和监督支出的责任；村公所还承担了乡村所有的财产管理和租赁事务；负责土壤改良和植树造林以及为所有财产转移做登记。乡村的财产转移只有在这间办公室进行才具有法律效力。村公所必须随时更新居民记录，因婚姻缔结而产生的身份变更记录，孩子出生记录、收养记录。每户家庭也要保管好同样的资料。此外，辖区居民如果牵扯到了法律或其他事务，都要被社区记载入案。所有这些资料从日本的每个角落收集过来，放到所在社区的居民登记办公室，并且进入个人档案。如果一个人想要申请一个职位，或者在审判前接受聆讯，或者在任何被要求提供身份证明的场合，他可以给自己原籍的居民办公室写信，或者亲自来这里，获取一份副本，呈交给需要看的人。所以人们是绝不轻易冒险给自己和家庭的档案留下污点的。
市、町和村因此都背负了相当多的责任。它是社区责任。在20世纪20年代，那时日本已经有了国家政治党派，尽管当时在很多国家“党派”意味着随任期而出现“执政党”和“在野党”的交替，但是在日本，地方管理体系基本上没有发生变动，依旧是地方上的长老直接领导，他们对整个社区发挥着作用。但是在三个方面，地方管理体系不具备自决权：所有的法官都是国家委派的，所有的治安力量和学校教师都是国家聘任的。因为大多数民事纠纷依旧是通过仲裁以及中间人来解决，法院的裁决事实上对地方行政事务影响甚少。警察的作用更重要一些。在公众集会时，警察必须在场，但是这种职责的行使并不常见，相反他们的大多数时间花在了整理个人和财产记录上。政府经常会将警察们从一个地方调到另一个地方，以避免他们和当地势力勾结，要让他们永远做当地的局外人。学校教师也经常调职。政府为学校规定每一个细节；而且，就像法国那样，国家的每一所学校在同一天要学习同样教材的同样一课。每一所学校在早晨的同一个时段，要收听同一个电台，做同一套早操。社区在学校、治安和法院判决上没有地方自决权。
因此，从各方面来说，日本政府与美国政府有天壤之别。在美国，通过选举出来的人可以获得行政和立法上的最高权力，地方控制是通过地方对治安和法院的直接领导来实现的。但是，日本在政府组建形式上与一些地道的西方国家，比如荷兰和比利时相比，并没有太大的差异。例如，日本和荷兰一样，女王的内阁制定各项法律的草案；在实践中国会不能发起立法活动。在1940年以前，从法律上来说，荷兰皇室甚至可以任命市长、镇长，因此它形式上的权力可以深及地方事务，这比日本皇室的权力更大；在实践中，荷兰皇室也的确经常核准某些地方任命。而且荷兰警察和法院系统都对皇室直接负责。在荷兰，学校可以由某一教派组织来筹建；而日本的学校体系也几乎照抄法国。在荷兰，地方上修建运河、围海拓地和地方开发的责任完全属于社区，而不是市长、镇长以及其他民选政府官员们的责任。
日本的政府结构和西方的真正迥异之处，并不在其结构，而在其功能。从古以来，日本人就在等级制中很驯服，并且他们非常依赖这种驯服习惯，这些旧习惯有的是在他们过去的经历中建立起来的，有的则是在他们的伦理系统和礼仪中形成的。只要内阁大臣在其“正确位置”上行使职责，那么国家就是可以依赖的，特权也会受到尊重。这并不是因为政策得到拥护，而是因为在日本超过特权界限是一种错误行为。在政策的最高层次，“公众观点”是不应该出现的。政府仅仅是要求“国民支持”。当政府在国内地方事务上树立起自己的官僚体系时，其正当性就会被恭顺地接受。在所有国内事务上，政府并不是大多数美国人所认为的“必要之恶”；在日本人眼中，政府似乎更近于“至善”。
而且，政府也在为国民意愿而不厌其烦地确认着“正确位置”。在司法领域的公共裁决权限上，说日本政府甚至是为了国民的利益而迎合国民，这并不为过。例如，国家农业部门的办事机构在提高农业生产技术方面，就像美国的爱达华州的农业部门那样，能够扮演一种小政府角色，很少用权力硬性推广。政府官员支持以政府信用为抵押的农村信用合作社，或者是农民供销合作社，但政府官员必须和地方有名望的人进行长期协商，并且遵守他们的决定。地方事务要求地方来处置。日本人的生活方式是，分配适当的权力，并且为其划定合适的范围。相对于西方文化来说，日本对“长者”更加服从和尊重，因此他们也获得了更多的行动自由。但是“长者”也必须严守本分。日本人的箴言是：万物各得其所，各安其分。
在宗教领域，明治政治家创造了奇怪的制度，远比政府制度更奇怪。在这方面，他们仍然执行相同的日本箴言。政府将宗教纳为其管辖领域，还将其作为国民统一性和优越性的特殊象征。除此之外，它为个人的崇拜活动留下了足够空间。这种受到国家管理的宗教，就是国家神道。日本人说，国家神道“不是宗教”，理由是它被视为国家象征而获得恰当的尊重，就像美国人对国旗行礼一样。所以日本有理由认为，号召所有公民都信奉国家神道，并没有违背西方人的宗教信仰自由原则。相比较而言，美国要求对着星条旗敬礼，倒更像是对宗教信仰自由原则的破坏。国家神道更是一种效忠的象征。因为它“不是宗教”，所以日本可以在学校里教授它，而不用担心会遭到西方人的批评。在学校的课本中，国家神道变成了从天神时代以来的日本历史，和对“万世一系的统治者”天皇的崇拜。国家神道是由国家支持，由国家规定的。其他宗教形式，甚至其他宗派的神道或祭祀神道，都只是作为个人宗教而存在，更不用说佛教和基督教派。这一点和美国很像。这两个领域在行政管理和财政支持上也是分开的：国家神道是由内务省神祇局掌控，它的神职人员、仪式和神社是由国库来支持的。祭祀神道、佛教和基督教各宗派都是由设在教育部（文部省）的一个“宗教局”来管理，并且经费来自信徒的个人捐献。
因为日本官方在这一主题上采取了这样的观点，谁也不能说国家神道是一个庞大的国家宗教，但是至少可以称呼它为一个庞大的机关。从庞大的祭奠天照大神的伊势神宫，到一些小的地方性神社，大大小小达11万个之多的神社排列在道路两旁。在那些小神社，担任神职的人只是在特殊仪式上才来此打扫一下。神官系统的全国性等级制和政界官员平行，从最低等的神职人员，然后是地区性的终身神职人员，到最顶端的神职界的“阁下”，权威力量沿阶而上。他们是在为国民履行仪式，而不是指挥国民来拜神。在国家神道中，没有什么东西和我们的教堂礼拜相似。因为国家神道不是宗教，法律禁止它的神职人员传授任何教义，而且那里也没有西方人所熟悉的宗教服务机构。相反，它的过程是这样的：在经常会持续好几天的仪式上，社区的官方代表们来到这里，站在神职人员面前，这位神职人员挥动一种装饰有麻绳和纸质飘带的“币帛”，为他们驱邪。然后神职人员打开内部神坛的门，用一种高频率的尖叫声呼唤神的降临，享用仪式上准备的饭食。神职人员开始祈祷，所有的参与者按照职衔顺序，各自贡上一种从古至今被奉为神圣的东西：一段从神树上截取下来的树枝，在它末端悬吊着白色的纸。然后神职人员再度尖声喊叫，送走神，并且关上内部神坛的门。在国家神道的祭祀日，就要由天皇来为他的人民致祭，同时政府部门也放假休息。但是这种祭祀日和地方神社的祭祀以及佛诞日举行的庆祝仪式不一样，不是群众性的节庆日。地方神社和佛诞日的祭祀都属于国家神道之外的“自由”领域。
在这一自由领域，日本人进行最能接近他们心灵的伟大宗派和祭祀活动。佛教一直是信众最广的宗教，具有不同教义和不同开山鼻祖的宗派在日本蓬勃发展、无处不在。甚至独立于国家神道之外的神道也有大量宗派。一些宗派甚至在20世纪30年代政府确立国家主义的地位之前，就成为净化国家主义的堡垒；一些宗派是用来治疗心灵创伤的，常被用来和“科学基督教派”[9]相比较；有一些信奉儒家教义；另有一些则强调显灵时的恍惚感，并且要去神山中的神社朝圣。民间的祭祀节日多是游离于国家神道之外的。在这样一些节日，人们蜂拥进入神社，每个人通过漱口来净化自己，并且通过推动钟绳敲钟和拍手来召唤神的降临。然后他们虔诚鞠躬，再通过另一种方式的敲钟和拍手来送走神。然后他们走出去，参加这一天中最主要的项目：在支起摊子的小贩那里买各种小摆设和小食品；观赏相扑比赛、傩舞[10]和神乐舞[11]，小丑的表演大大加强了神乐舞的娱乐效果，让人们感到非常愉快。一位曾经住在日本的英国人回忆日本的祭祀节日时，引用了威廉·布莱克的诗句：
如果教堂给我们几杯啤酒，
给我们一把点燃灵魂和盛宴的愉悦之火，
我们会歌唱整天，我们会祈祷终日，
没有人再想离开教堂，步履蹒跚回家。
除了少数将自己的一生都奉献给宗教并且过着苦修生活的人，宗教在日本面目并不严苛。日本人同样会放弃宗教朝圣的艰苦，而将其变为非常愉快的假日旅行。
明治政治家们就是这样很小心地划出界限，标示出政府功能发挥的领域，也标示出国家神道在宗教中的领域。他们给国民留出其他领域。但是他们确保了在新的等级制中，自己居于官阶的顶端，在他们认为直接涉及国家的事务中能够居于主导地位。在成立军队系统时，他们遇到了类似难题。就像在其他领域一样，他们在军队中废除了古老的种姓制度，甚至比废除平民中的种姓制度还要彻底。虽然实际上还保留了一些旧传统，但他们在军队系统中取缔了敬语。军队里面按照军功来晋升，而不是看其家庭出身如何；在军队中，一个人可以上升到在其他领域难以达到的地位。正因为如此，日本人对军人非常尊敬，而且军人也当之无愧——让国民都乐意支持军队招募，这应该是最好的方法。另外，同一个排和一个连的士兵都是来自同一个地区的邻居，和平时期的军事装备也是由哨所附近的家庭提供的。这不仅仅意味着士兵和地方能保持联系，而且还意味着每个士兵在两年服役期间，士兵和平民之间的关系、一年兵和两年兵之间的关系会取代以前武士和农民、富人和穷人之间的关系。军队在很多方面提升了日本的民主水平，是真正的人民军队。其他大多数国家的军队只是一种保卫现状的强大的武装力量，日本的军队则不是这样，日本军人同情小农阶级，并且这种同情还一再导致军队向强大的金融家和工厂主提出抗议。
日本的政治家可能不愿看到成立一支人民军队所导致的后果，但是当他们看到这种组建方式很适合确保军队在等级制中的崇高地位时，他们愿意接受它。他们确保将军队置于最高的领域。他们并没有将这一制度放在宪法中，但是一直以来的习惯，使大家意识到军部是独立于平民政府的。举例来说，相比较于外务省和内政各省的大臣，陆海军大臣可以直接与天皇会面，因此他们可以通过他们的方式以天皇的名义来对别人产生影响。他们不需要知会或咨询内阁中的同僚。除此之外，军人可以监督内阁其他成员。他们可以通过拒绝委派陆海军将领入阁的方式来阻止他们不信任的内阁的组建。如果没有高级现役军官充任陆军和海军大臣之职，内阁也组建不起来——因为文官和已退休军官是无法担任此职的。如果任何部门的行为让军部感到不痛快，很简单，军部能够通过召回他们在内阁的代表（陆军和海军大臣）的方式来解散内阁。在最高政策层，军部首脑确保了自己不必忍受任何干扰。如果说它还需要更具效力的担保的话，这在宪法中已经有了：“如果国会不支持政府提交的预算案，那么上一年的预算自动成为政府当年预算的参考值。”陆军成功占领中国东北之时，外务省曾希望陆军不走这一步棋[12]，这可以作为一条例证，显示出内阁没有取得一致意见时，军部会趁决策未定之机指使他的指挥官采取行动。对军部，就像在其他领域一样，凡属等级特权者，日本人倾向于接受他们的行为的一切后果。这并不是因为他们同意这样的政策，而是因为他们不支持藐视等级界限的行为。
在工业发展领域，日本追逐一种超乎寻常的过程，这是任何西方国家都不能与之相提并论的。这一次又是那些“阁下”安排了这场游戏而且制定了规则。他们不仅仅提出计划，他们还组建起他们认为需要的工业，为其提供了财政支持。由一个政府机构来组织并经营这些企业。外国技术被引进来，日本人也被派到海外学习。然后，就如他们自己所说，当这些工业“被很好地组织发展，而且越来越兴旺”时，政府按照初始设想，将它们卖给私人公司。这些官办企业被以“荒谬的低价”逐步卖给了经过挑选的金融寡头，即著名的财阀，最主要的是三井[13]和三菱[14]。日本的政治家们认定，工业的发展对日本太重要了，所以不能相信供求法则，也不能相信私人企业。但是这些政策绝对不是来自于社会主义理念；很明显最终是财阀获得了所有好处。日本人要达成的目标是，以最小的失败和浪费来建立她最需要的工业。
通过这种方式，日本对“资本主义生产的起点和成功过程的标准方式”进行了修正。她并没有起始于日用消费品生产和轻工业，而是始于重工业。武器制造、造船厂、钢铁工厂、铁路建设等优先发展起来，并且很快在工业效能上达到了一个很高的层次。并不是所有工厂都被转交给了私人所有，大部分军事工业依旧保留在政府机构统辖之下，并且得到了政府特别款项的资助。
在政府给予优先权的工业领域，小商人，或者说没有政府背景的企业主，并没有“各得其所”。只有政府以及那些受委托并获得政策倾斜的巨头们，才能在这一领域活动。但是正如日本人的日常生活领域一样，也有一个工业领域是自由的。它们是“剩余”工业，依靠最小的资本和廉价劳动力的最大化使用来运营。这些轻工业在没有现代技术的情况下也能进行，而且现在依然存在。他们的运行是按照我们以前所谓的家庭工厂形式进行的：一个小本制造商买来原料，先贷给一个家庭工厂或者一个只有四五人的小工厂进行加工，回收产品，然后再贷出原料，几次反复之后，最后将商品卖给商人或者出口商。在20世纪30年代，不超过53%的日本人受雇于这种不超过五个人的小工厂和作坊。很多这样的工人受到家长制作风下的学徒制习俗的保护。在日本的大城市里还有很多工人是坐在自己家、背着娃娃干零活的妈妈们。
在日本人的生活方式方面，日本这种工业界的两重性，和政府、宗教界的两重性具有同等重要地位。当日本政治家们决定他们需要财界贵族体制来匹配其他领域的等级制时，他们为此建立了战略性工业，选择了政治家们所中意的商人家族，使其在“正确位置”上与其他等级制加强联系。在政府的计划中没有想过要削弱政府与这些金融巨头和财阀的联系，政府不仅赋予他们利润，还赋予他们高等地位。从日本人对于利润和金钱的传统态度来说，财界贵族不可避免地会遭到国民的攻击，但政府还是尽其所能，按照广被接受的等级制观念来扶植财界贵族。不过它并没有完全成功，因为财阀还是遭到少壮派军官和乡村居民的攻击。但是事实已经证明，日本舆论中最受攻击的领域不是财阀，而是“成金”[15]。“成金”经常被翻译为“暴发户”，但是这对日本人的感受来说并不公平。在美国，暴发户是严格意义上的“新来者”；他们之所以可笑是因为在社交场所显得笨拙，他们还没有多少时间来修炼礼仪。然而这一缺点被他们感人的致富经历所补偿：他们从小木屋起步，从一匹骡子做动力的榨油作坊起步，最后变成超级有钱的油田巨子。但是在日本，“成金”是取自日本将棋的一个术语，意思是一个步兵忽然变成了女王。它是说一个小兵像“一个大亨”一样在会议桌前咆哮逞威。他的等级权利中并没有这一条。“成金”被认为是通过欺诈和剥削其他人来致富的，他所受到的挖苦和美国人对待“白手起家者”的态度完全是两码事。日本人在等级制中为巨额财富留出了一个位置，并且和它抱作一团；但是，一旦财富是从其他领域获取的，日本舆论就会对它进行猛烈抨击。
总而言之，日本人通过不断强调等级制来规范他们的世界。在家庭和人际关系中，年纪、辈分、性别和阶级决定着适当的行为。在政府、宗教、军队和工业等每一个领域中，也被仔细地分为很多等级，任何高级或低级的人越出其权限都必然会遭到惩罚。只要“正确位置”一直存在，日本人就毫无怨言地坚守着这一切。这让他们觉得安全。当然，考虑到他们最高的幸福居然是被保护起来的，这也可以说他们经常感到“不安全”；而他们之所以感觉安全，是因为他们接受了等级制的合法性。这是他们的人生观特征，就像信赖平等和私营企业是美国人生活方式的特征一样。
当日本想将她有关“安全”的模式输出时，它的报应来了。在它自己的国家，等级制符合民众的观念，因为民众就是从等级制中培养出来的。在这个类型的世界中，野心只能以这样的方式形成并发展。但是它作为一件日用品出口，就很要命了。其他国家十分愤慨日本人那些大言不惭的言论，认为他们无礼而邪恶。日本的军官和军队在每一个占领区，对于当地居民居然不欢迎他们感到震惊。在等级制中，这些占领区的人民尽管地位低，但日本不是已经给他们提供了一个位置吗？那些人甚至原来处于更低的地位，日本提供的难道不是他们理想中的等级地位吗？日本的战争服务机构不断拍摄一些战争电影，宣扬中国人如何“热爱”日本，片子中痛苦绝望、沦落风尘的中国少女在沉浸爱河之时发现了幸福，而她们所恋上的都是日本军人或者日本工程师。这和纳粹的征服论完全不同。而且从长期来看这是不会成功的。他们无法像强求自己那样强求别的国家也那么做。他们却认为自己能办到，这是他们的错误所在。他们没有认识到，那种适合日本人的“各得其所，各安其分”的道德准则，并不能加诸其他民族。其他民族没有这种准则。这是纯正的日本货。日本的作家们将接受这一伦理体系视为理所当然，因此他们都不会去描述它。但是一个人要想了解日本人，必须先了解这种体系。
注释：
[1] 明治政府给予大名和公卿“华族”身份，废除大名与家臣的主从关系，幕府直属的家臣和各藩的武士改称“士族”。
[2] 即《散发脱刀令》。明治政府宣布“可以自由选择断发脱刀”，号召武士解散发髻，并不再时刻佩刀。在1873年3月明治天皇放开头发后，以官僚为中心也开始盛行放开头发。此法主旨是废除武士特权，并推进文明开化。
[3] 即秩禄公债。1876年8月，明治政府正式命令所有领取俸禄的人一律献出俸禄，政府一次性发给“秩禄公债”，从发行后第六年起以抽签方式30年内偿还。这笔秩禄公债共计约1. 73亿日元，大部分转化成为日本产业化的启动资金。通过秩禄公债，日本的封建贵族阶级顺利完成了向资本家角色的转化。
[4] 引自赫尔伯特·诺尔曼的《日本近代国家的诞生》。——原注
[5] 伊藤博文（1841～1909），使日本迈进现代化国家的功臣之一。1885年12月出任首届内阁总理大臣兼宫内大臣，并开始起草宪法。被誉为“明治宪法之父”。1905年，伊藤博文被任命为第一任韩国统监。1909年10月，被朝鲜爱国志士安重根刺杀身亡。
[6] 此处当为金子坚太郎子爵。1877年木户孝允已死。1889年，金子坚太郎奉伊藤博文之命，携带英文版日本宪法到欧洲征求意见，会见了斯宾塞。
[7] 赫伯特·斯宾塞（1820～1903），英国社会学家。1852年发表论文《进化的假说》，首次提出社会进化论思想。他被人称为“社会达尔文主义之父”，他将进化理论适者生存应用在社会学上尤其是教育及阶级斗争中。
[8] 引自约翰·艾勃里的《日本民族》。——原注
[9] 科学基督教派，是基督教新教的一个边缘教派。总教堂位于美国波士顿，由玛丽·贝可·艾迪于1879年创立。基督教科学派认为“基督的科学”就是耶稣赖以治病的圣灵，所以其教徒应依赖祈祷来治疗疾病，这样人就会得到救赎。
[10] 傩舞：具有驱鬼逐疫功能，以戴鬼脸为其特色。
[11] 神乐舞：日本传统舞蹈，用以祈祷生活的安定，农业、狩猎、捕鱼的丰收。
[12] 当时任外务大臣的是币原喜重郎，他主张同英美协调，“尊重”中国的合理要求。军部对此严重不满，谴责其为“软弱外交”。
[13] 三井：日本六大财团之一。旗下成员企业主要有东芝、丰田、索尼、石川岛播、王子造纸、三井物产、东食、东粮、三井银行、三井信托、三井生命、三井海上等。
[14] 三菱：日本六大财团之一。旗下成员企业主要有三菱重工、三菱电机、三菱汽车、旭硝子、麒麟啤酒、三菱商事、三菱银行、三菱信托、明治生命、东京海上等。
[15] 步兵是日本将棋的棋子之一，在升级后称为“成金”。步兵的攻击力极低，但升级后拥有与金将相等的攻击力。